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Non-technical Summary
The Eastern enlargement of the EU is a project with huge political and economic
chances. In spite of these chances, the success of the enlargement process is by no
means certain as can be seen from the difficult accession negotiations. For the
success of the enlargement process it is important to have a better understanding of
the obstacles. These obstacles are at least partially of a political-economic nature.
Even though there are good arguments to regard enlargement as a “win-win” project
improving welfare for new and old member countries, enlargement might
nevertheless hurt personal interests of important actors. This kind of political-
economic obstacle to enlargement is the focus of this paper. For this purpose,
standard public choice reasoning is applied. The starting assumption of the analysis
is that the enlargement process can only be successfully completed if the interests of
decisive actors in present EU countries are respected.
Consequently, the interests of EU-15 governments, Members of the European
Parliament and Commissioners are explored. It turns out that Eastern enlargement is
not necessarily popular among many of these actors due to following reasons:
Enlargement is not a popular issue among voters in the present EU member
countries, it also reduces the capacity of the EU budget to serve important interest
groups in the EU-15 countries. Members of the European Parliament will
particularly suffer from a deterioration of re-election chances due to the 700-seats-
cap on the size of Parliament. Actors can be expected to compare these
disadvantages with advantages of enlargement that arise from the larger size of EU
for example due to a better internalisation of externalities.
Enlargement negotiations are further burdened by a strategic difficulty that results
from the fundamental difference between candidates’ pre-entry and post-entry
power. While before accession a candidate country seems to be in a very weak
bargaining position, after accession it necessarily acquires equal rights to take part in
the EU institutions’ decision making. Thus, post-entry the country will have equal
rights for example in shaping EU transfer policies. This strategic constellation
complicates negotiations since it makes it impossible for candidate countries today
to commit to a certain long-run distribution of enlargement’s costs and benefits that
would safeguard the interest of EU-15 actors.
Based on this strategic and political-economic insights the paper offers a re-
interpretation of the Intergovernmental Conference 2000 (IGC 2000) and the Treaty
of Nice. Since the IGC is probably the last opportunity to change the EU
constitution without requiring a consent with the new members, the IGC will also be
used to protect the interests of EU-15 actors during and after enlargement for the
disadvantage of new members. There are two different approaches to protect the
interests of present EU actors. The first approach aims at permanent constitutional
changes that work for the advantage of actors from incumbent member countries.
Examples concern the re-weighting of votes for the disadvantage of smaller
countries, the extension of qualified majority and easier conditions for closer
cooperation among a subgroup of member countries. The second approach uses
transitory rules that helps present individuals without giving a permanent protection
for people that in future will replace these individuals. An example concerns
comfortable interim provisions until the reduction of EU-15 seats in the European
Parliament takes effect.
The final part of the paper presents some indicators for the attraction of different
candidate countries from the perspective of decisive actors in EU-15. In the logic of
the political-economic approach, those candidates should be most attractive that –
for a given size of GDP - combine relatively few political power in EU institutions
with low stress on EU transfer policies. The countries of the Luxembourg group plus
Slovakia are shown to lead in terms of political-economic attraction although the
results have to be treated with some caution due to the necessary arbitrariness in the
construction of any such indicator.
The paper concludes with some normative considerations: It is an often experienced
fact of political life that welfare improving projects do not necessarily materialise
due to the resistance of vested interests. This danger is also real in regard to EU
enlargement and it is hardly a promising strategy to simply appeal for more altruism
in politics. The economic profession, however, should work harder to find evidence
for the benefits and to come to a more realistic assessment of existing risks of
enlargement. A better public knowledge about these issues would be likely to make
enlargement more popular among the general public in EU-15. In a democracy, this
is the most promising way to make the success of the project compatible with the
self-interest of elected governments.
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11 Introduction
The Eastern enlargement of the EU is a project with huge political and economic
chances. In the political dimension, the perspective of a stable and peaceful
continent is a highly promising yield of enlargement. In the economic dimension,
the integration of reform countries from Central and Eastern Europe into the single
European market offers scope for welfare improvements both in the East and the
West. Apart from static gains from trade there is the well justified hope that the
growth perspective of the EU as a whole will benefit from the membership of
emerging market economies with their high growth potential.
In spite of these chances, the success of the enlargement process is by no means
certain as can be seen from the difficult accession negotiations. Since the start of
negotiations between the EU and the first countries from Central and Eastern Europe
in March 1998 many problems and disappointments have been encountered. While
initially the year 2002 was declared to be the desired year of full membership by
governments like that from Poland and Hungary, in the meantime later dates are in
discussion.
For the success of the enlargement process it is important to have a better
understanding of the obstacles. These obstacles are at least partially of a political-
economic nature. Even though there are good arguments to regard enlargement as a
“win-win” project improving welfare for new and old member countries,
enlargement might nevertheless hurt personal interests of important actors. This kind
of political-economic obstacle to enlargement is the focus of this paper. For this
purpose, standard public choice reasoning is applied. The starting assumption of the
analysis is that the enlargement process can only be successfully completed if the
interests of decisive actors in present EU countries are respected.
This view leads to a new interpretation both of the character of enlargement
negotiations and the Intergovernmental Conference 2000 (IGC 2000) that is to result
in the Treaty of Nice. One function of the negotiations that fix the terms of accession
in this sense is to defend the interests of individuals like members of the European
Parliament, Commissioners and members of present national governments. The
constitutional changes through the Treaty of Nice and the choice of member
countries can in the same logic also be regarded as instruments to defend the
interests of these decisive actors. If these interest can not be guaranteed sufficiently
enlargement is in danger.
Even with this rational choice view the preconditions for a successful enlargement
would not be very complicated if a complete agreement between old and new
members could be fixed. A complete agreement would for all times define the
2distribution of costs and benefits of enlargement. Such an agreement could
guarantee the decisive actors today that enlargement is beneficial for them. Due to
the EU constitution, however, a complete agreement is not possible. The pre-entry
and post-entry position of new members differ widely. While before accession a
candidate country seems to be in a very weak bargaining position, after accession it
necessarily acquires equal rights to take part in the EU institutions’ decision making
and thus to take part in decision on further burden sharing. This strategic
constellation complicates negotiations since it makes it impossible for candidate
countries today to commit to a certain long-run distribution of enlargement’s costs
and benefits.
Enlargement is decided by actors both in the present EU-15 and in the candidate
countries. Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is on decisive actors in the West.
Although an extension of the analysis to Eastern players would deserve merits, this
first step seems more pressing: Presently the necessary unanimous support of EU
institutions and governments for enlargement seems to be the far more critical
condition for a successful enlargement than the internal consensus in candidate
countries in favour of EU membership (see below figures 1 and 3).
Studies on the political-economic dimension of present enlargement negotiations are
scarce. While public choice issues have attracted much interest in the transition
literature (for example HILLMAN, 1994; BACKHAUS AND KRAUSE, 1997; BASTIAN,
1998), the process of EU enlargement has rarely been analysed in this way. The
analysis of BOFINGER (1995) is largely restricted to the interests of trade related
lobbies. KOHLER (2000) looks at the interests of EU-15 countries in regard to
enlargement but largely abstracts from personal interests of decisive actors in EU
institutions. Furthermore these analyses are silent on the strategic consequences
resulting from the different pre- and post-entry position of new member countries.
BALDWIN ET AL. (1997) is helpful insofar as it analyses the impact of past
enlargements on the EU budget in a political-economic perspective.
The analysis proceeds in the following way: The next section identifies decisive
actors in EU-15 and looks at their attitude towards enlargement. Section 3 analyses
the strategic characteristics of accession negotiations. The following section 4 offers
a new look at the IGC as an instrument to protect the relative power of present
member countries in an enlarged EU. Section 5 depicts the relative appeal of
candidate countries in the light of the political-economic approach followed by the
overall conclusions.
32 The decisive actors and their interests
Who are the actors that decide on enlargement? Article 49 Treaty on European
Union (see appendix 1) states that a successful enlargement requires a unanimous
decision in the Council and an absolute majority in the European Parliament. The
European Commission is consulted. Furthermore, an unanimous agreement between
all old and new member countries has to be reached and ratified in each country in
accordance with respective constitutional requirements.
Thus, it is necessary to look at least at the interests of the Council, the European
Parliament and also the European Commission whose consulting role should not be
neglected given the importance of the Commission’s reports on the progress of
candidates towards accession. In order to keep the analysis tractable further actors
from the national level (e.g. national parliaments, parties, constitutional courts and
the general public in countries with referenda)  are not included although they might
be important due to their impact on the enlargement decision in the national
ratification process (STOIBER AND THURNER, 2000).
Council
National governments represented in the Council act under the re-election constraint.
Thus they can not be expected to support enlargement if this would seriously
undermine their chances of success at the next national election. Opinion polls (see
figures 1 and 2) show that enlargement is not a particularly popular issue among
citizens of EU-15. Among all other topics presented in the poll, enlargement gets the
lowest points in regard to priority. Only for three countries of Central and Eastern
Europe - the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – there are more people in favour
of accession than against. Nevertheless, even for these three countries an absolute
majority in favour of accession is lacking. Citizens in the EU are afraid of a large
fiscal burden. Apart from that, the public debate indicates fears of massive East-
West-mobility and its consequences for the welfare state and the labour market.
Professional economists’ expectations on the long-run economic consequences
contradicting public opinion are not likely to have an equally important impact on
the governments’ position. Although most economic studies tend to describe the
economic consequences of enlargement as a “win-win” effect in terms of societies’
welfare, where both old and new members will benefit (BALDWIN ET AL., 1997;
COURBIS AND WELFE, 1999) this does not convincingly predict a positive stance of
EU governments in regard to enlargement in a political-economic view. In a
democracy, governments care about the dominant public perception of economic
consequences rather than professional long-run forecasts of these consequences.
4Furthermore, the positive welfare effects of enlargement in Western Europe are
expected to be relatively small in comparison to Eastern Europe.  BALDWIN ET AL.
(1997) show that the liberalisation implied with enlargement is asymmetric. Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are more protectionist than the EU and
EU-trade has a much higher importance for CEEC than vice versa CEEC trade for
the EU. Thus fully liberalising this trade implies larger welfare gains for the East
than for the West since the extent of welfare gains is positively related to the
reduction in protectionism.
Even with an indifferent or critical general public the economic effects could be
politically important if they were regionally or sectorally concentrated and thus of
concern for special interest groups. Highly affected lobbies with a large potential for
mobilising votes could have an impact on the national government’s position
towards the one or the other direction. With the exceptions of agriculture and trade
unions it is hard to identify sectoral interest groups particularly affected by
enlargement. The described asymmetry (small relative liberalisation in the West –
large in the East) reduces the likelihood that support for enlargement by exporting
industries will be strong in the EU.
Import competing industries will have a position between scepticism and neutrality:
There are complaints that pre-entry competition from CEE is unfair due to less strict
environmental or labour safety regulations. Since enlargement forces CEECs to lift
their regulatory levels to the minimum standards of the acquis, this could be
welcomed.
While the EU lives in a relatively open trade regime in general this does not hold for
agriculture. Here the difference in trade relations with an extra-EU economy and a
member country of the Common Market is significant. For farmers in Western
Europe, the issue of enlargement clearly is of importance given the share of the
agricultural sector in the candidate countries. EU farmers have proven to be a
powerful lobby with some influence on governments. Resistance of farmers against
enlargement could therefore have an impact on the Council decision. Trade unions
might be opposed to enlargement due to the effects of trade liberalisation and labour
mobility on real wages.
Summarising the positions of EU special interest groups it is hard to expect any
significant support counteracting the general public’s scepticism. On the contrary –
farmer lobbies and trade unions could become active opponents.
5Figure 1: Public support for enlargement in EU-15 (autumn 1999)
Source: Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2000), question posed: „For each of the following countries, would
you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union“. Difference to 100 is the percentage of  “don’t
know”.
Figure 2: Priorities for EU actions: Preferences of EU-15 citizens
Source: Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2000), question posed: „I am going to read out a list of actions that
the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?“.
Difference to 100 is the percentage of  “don’t know”.
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6EU-15 governments would also have to reckon with a decreasing capacity of the EU
budget to serve as a politically useful distributive tool for the benefit of domestic
farmers and regions. Due to the construction of structural and agricultural policies,
the poor and agricultural new member countries would necessarily become net
beneficiaries of the system at the costs of present member countries. This statement
holds independently from the pattern of redistribution among present members. Both
net-contributors and net-beneficiaries of today’s EU-15 would have to reckon with a
deterioration of their position after enlargement.
Judging from these considerations the governments represented in the Council could
in the best case not expect to win popularity at home. Possibly, however,
governments would even harm popularity and thus reduce chances for re-election.
Why should EU governments then support enlargement? One answer might simply
be that governing politicians have a programmatic preference for it: The integration
of former communist European countries into the EU in order to create a stable
political landscape in Europe is a foreign and security policy objective present in
most programmes of governing parties. Answers that are more convincing in a
political-economic view come from well known self-interests the Council pursues
with European integration (VAUBEL, 1994): Centralisation of competencies at the
EU level helps the European government to improve their bargaining positions vis-
à-vis non-member countries for example in trade negotiations at the world level.
Furthermore, a “cartel of politicians” at the European level can help to limit political
and economic competition between countries that constitutes an inconvenient
restriction. But also governments acting as welfare maximisers might have an
interest in extending the regional coverage of EU policies: Integrating new countries
into the Community is helpful for internalising all sorts of externalities. One
important example concerns environmental policy for cross-border pollution of air
and water.
Thus present EU governments face a trade-off: On the one hand enlargement is
beneficial for important political functions of EU activities. On the other hand there
is the danger that distribution of fiscal resources develops for the disadvantage of
EU-15 countries.
European Parliament
Since a European MP is elected by the same voters as the national governments the
lacking popularity of enlargement among EU-15 voters should also restrict his
enthusiasm for the issue. There are, however, additional considerations. With a
positive vote on enlargement a Member of the European Parliament reduces his re-
7election chances independent from voters’ reaction at the ballot-box. The Treaty of
Amsterdam has limited the size of the Parliament at 700 seats (presently 626). Thus,
any enlargement requiring seats for more than 74 MP from new member countries
would make a reduction of incumbent countries’ seats necessary and thus reduce
chances of present MP to regain a seat. Table 1 shows that an accession of all 13
candidate countries would force a reduction of total EU-15 seats by up to 28%
percent (from the perspective of single EU-15 countries the reduction is even larger).
This simple arithmetic indicates that the incumbent MP would not welcome a fast
accession of many countries due to a significant reduction in re-election chances –
independent from voters preferences on the issue.
The Parliament’s new statute for the compensation of its members is to apply a
formula oriented at the average compensation of members of national parliaments in
the EU (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1999). This could further reduce European MPs
enthusiasm for a fast enlargement since they might suffer from income losses. Even
if this formula would not be applied mechanically in the future, enlargement would
probably limit the scope for future income increases of the MPs.
Given that the European Parliament favours centralisation and an expansion of the
EU budget in order to enlarge its responsibilities it might regard enlargement as an
helpful instrument. Enlargement will allow for further growth of the budget. The
question is, however, whether a present MP’s utility is derived from the size of the
overall budget or only from those shares that can be used for domestic purposes –
e.g. projects benefiting the home constituency.  As argued above enlargement will
tend to restrict the ability of EU-15 actors to use the EU budget for domestic pork-
barrels. Resistance to enlargement could also be augmented if MP fear that there is a
trade-off between deepening and widening, in this case assent to enlargement would
contradict the European Parliament’s natural desire for a advancing centralisation at
the European level.
Commission
Applying only the theory of bureaucracy’s simple principle of budget maximisation,
the interest of the Commission in regard to enlargement would be easily identified:
Enlargement makes it necessary to further expand the Commission’s budget and
staff. Furthermore, the powers assigned to the Commission by the EU constitution
would be extended to further countries with millions of inhabitants – changes clearly
in the interest of a power and budget maximising institution.
8Table 1: Allocation of EP seats and Council votes
population
1999
(in 1,000)
present
EP
seats
EP seats
option 1
implied
reduction
EP seats
option 2
implied
reduction
council votes,
extrapolation
Germany 82038 99 92 -7.07% 71 -28.28% 10
United Kingdom 59247 87 68 -21.84% 62 -28.74% 10
France 58966 87 68 -21.84% 62 -28.74% 10
Italy 57612 87 66 -24.14% 62 -28.74% 10
Spain 39394 64 46 -28.13% 46 -28.13% 8
Netherlands 15760 31 21 -32.26% 23 -25.81% 5
Greece 10533 25 15 -40.00% 18 -28.00% 5
Belgium 10213 25 15 -40.00% 18 -28.00% 5
Portugal 9980 25 15 -40.00% 18 -28.00% 5
Sweden 8854 22 14 -36.36% 16 -27.27% 4
Austria 8082 21 13 -38.10% 15 -28.57% 4
Denmark 5313 16 10 -37.50% 12 -25.00% 3
Finland 5160 16 10 -37.50% 12 -25.00% 3
Ireland 3744 15 8 -46.67% 11 -26.67% 3
Luxembourg 429 6 4 -33.33% 6 0.00% 2
Turkey 64385 73 64 10
Poland 38667 46 46 8
Romania 22489 28 32 6
Czech Republic 10290 15 18 5
Hungary 10092 15 18 5
Bulgaria 8230 13 15 4
Slovakia 5393 10 12 3
Lithuania 3701 8 11 3
Latvia 2439 7 7 3
Slovenia 1978 6 7 3
Estonia 1446 6 6 3
Cyprus 752 4 6 2
Malta 379 4 6 2
Sum present seats of
option 1 winners
among EU-15 (excl.
neutral Spain)
360
Sum EU-15 375325 465 -25.72% 452 -27.80% 87
Sum 13 new members 170241 235 248 57
Sum 12 new members
(without Turkey)
105856 162 184 47
Share EU-15/EU-27 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.65
Share EU-15/EU-28 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.60
TOTAL 545566 626 700 700 144
Seat allocation Parliament: Option 1 is based on a calculation in direct proportion to population after allocation of a
minimum of four to each Member States. Option 2 is based on an extrapolation of the present allocation. Vote
allocation Council: Based on extrapolation of present system. All allocations are “official” in the sense that they are
options included in presidency notes circulated at the IGC. For exact source: see appendix 2.
9A more differentiated view, however, leads to questions whether the present staff of
the Commission really favours enlargement as a means to maximise self-interest.
One topic of the IGC 2000 is a reform of the national representation in the
Commission. One idea that was already in the discussion in Amsterdam is that the
five large countries give up the second commissioner. A more extreme limitation of
the Commission’s size would even abolish the principle “one country – one
commissioner”. This reform debate shows that enlargement could harm present
commissioners’ chances to be re-appointed in 2005. Even with a moderate reform –
only the large countries give up the second seat – half of the commissioners would
be personally negatively affected by a deterioration of career prospects.
These considerations do not hold for lifetime civil servants working for the
Commission. Nevertheless, they could also suffer from enlargement by a
deterioration of career prospects and increasing work pressure – both important
elements in a bureaucrat’s utility function. Although there are no formal quota for
EU nationalities in Commission staff, each country wants to be represented
appropriately. Only four years after the 1995 accession of Sweden, Finland and
Austria these countries had already gained shares in the Commission’s staff roughly
proportionate to their countries’ population (NEUSS AND  HILZ, 1999). This justifies
the expectation that after a new enlargement nationals from the new members will
be in a privileged position at recruitment and promotions. Assuming that the new
countries will be particular keen in being represented in the top ranks of the
bureaucratic hierarchy enlargement could deteriorate career prospects for civil
servants with EU-15 nationality.
The following simple calculation hints at an increasing work pressure in the
Commission after enlargement. The workload of the Commission as a guardian of
the Treaties can be expected to grow with the number of member countries and the
EU population. A full enlargement of 12 countries would imply an increase in the
number of countries by 48%, EU population would increase by 28%. Judging from
the results of the Agenda 2000 the EU budget is planned to grow only in proportion
with GNP (being fixed at a level of 1.27% of EU GNP). On the basis of 1998 data, a
12 country enlargement would, however, expand EU GDP only by 4.5%. Thus
workload will grow much faster than the budget – not a pleasant perspective for
Commission’s present staff.
Summing up the personal interests of commissioners and civil servants, Eastern
enlargement should be far less popular in the Commission than the 1995
enlargement when accession of three wealthy countries did neither impair
commissioners’ personal career chances nor implied a mismatch between increase in
workload and budgetary expansion. In analogy to the Parliament support for
enlargement might be further reduced if there are no provisions that reduce the
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trade-off between deepening and widening since the Commission is clearly
committed to further centralisation.
Resulting conditions for EU actors’ assent
Looking in this way at decisive EU actors the conclusion is that an assent for
enlargement is not obvious without limiting the disadvantages these actors could
face. Even if one abstracts from the Commission’s interests due to its mere
consulting role in the enlargement process, the interests of the Members of the
European Parliament and the national governments have to be taken seriously. In
this public choice view, it is an important function of the IGC and the enlargement
negotiations to safeguard convincingly the interests of today’s governments and
Members of Parliament without whose consent enlargement would have to fail.
3 Strategic issues
As seen above the decisive actors in the Council and the European Parliament may
like enlargement from a programmatic point of view, but also fear disadvantages for
example in terms of budgetary consequences limiting their ability to serve domestic
interest groups. This will be particularly relevant for the governments represented in
the Council who fear decreasing popularity at home if consequences of enlargement
like high mobility leads to negative effects for some groups in the domestic
population (even if these effects might only be a mistaken perception). A further
concern is that enlargement could prevent the EU from a degree of centralisation
that is desired by these actors. Candidate countries would, of course, have an
incentive to take care of these concerns and to accept the corresponding conditions
as long as accession remains beneficial given these conditions. However, the
strategic constellation of EU enlargement does not allow for this easy solution. In
order to shed light on these strategic problems, enlargement negotiations are
interpreted in the context of two standard game-theoretic concepts: the discounting
infinite bargaining game of Rubinstein and a dynamic (two-period) game with
imperfect commitment.
Accession negotiations as infinite bargaining with discounting
Assuming a candidate country being able to commit itself for all future behaviour as
a full EU member, enlargement negotiations can in a simplified way be interpreted
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as a standard bargaining problem of the kind “splitting a pie” between two parties in
the setting of RUBINSTEIN (1982).
In this view, the terms of accession simply determine how the benefits of
enlargement are distributed between the incumbent and the new member. While
these benefits have obviously to be at least non-zero for both sides, the exact
distribution is the result of a bargain. A precondition for enlargement is an
agreement on the distribution of these advantages. Particularly the budgetary issues
raised in the enlargement negotiations fit well into this interpretation: Decisions
whether new member countries get equal treatment in the Common Agricultural or
the Structural Policy have a predominantly distributive character. It is hard to see for
example objective efficiency related arguments to determine these issues.
Any delay caused by the duration of bargaining makes both parties suffer from
discounting, though discount factors may differ. In principle, enlargement
negotiations have an infinite time horizon: The incumbent and the candidate country
alternate in offering each other a specific distribution of the pie and this goes on
until the other side accepts an offer. If one side accepts the offer of the other side the
game ends and the gains from enlargement materialise distributed at the shares
agreed.
With qI and qN denoting the shares of the incumbent and the new country
respectively and dI (dN) the discount factor (bounded between 0 and 1) of the
incumbent and the new member, the solution of the bargaining in the  RUBINSTEIN
(1982) model are the following (this is a standard result, see also  RASMUSEN, 1996,
ch. 11 for a derivation):
NI
N
I dd
d
q
-
-
=
1
1  and   IN qq -= 1
Given the perfect information assumption this distribution will result without any
delay and as the unique solution. Due to the rational expectation view implied,
already the first offer will be chosen in such a way that it will be acceptable for the
counter-party. Even from this extremely simple bargaining interpretation there are at
least two important messages for the strategic issues involved in EU accession
negotiations: First, the conflict over the distribution of enlargement benefits between
old and new members as such is no reason for any delay or for fears of a final failure
of negotiations. Second, the discount factors are crucial for the resulting distribution
of gains. The more desperate one side is to realise enlargement the lower will be its
final share in the agreement. The fact that 0>¶¶ II dq  and 0<¶¶ NI dq  clarifies this:
The higher the incumbent’s and the lower the new member’s discount factor the
larger will be the resulting share of the incumbent. This clearly hints on a weak
12
position of the EU candidates: In many candidate countries the consensus on EU
membership is broad (see figure 3 in comparison to figure 1) and for governments in
these countries the accession date has become a highly prestigious issue so that
discount factors can be regarded to be relatively small compared to that of
incumbent governments where enlargement is far from being an urgent desire –
neither in the view of the population nor in regard to the personal interests of the
decisive actors.
Figure 3: Public support for EU accession in some candidate countries (May 2000)
Source: Public Opinion Research Center  CBOS, Warsaw, May 2000, question posed: „If a referendum was currently
held on the access to the European Union, how would you vote?“
Enlargement and the problem of imperfect commitment
The strategic interpretation of enlargement negotiations in the preceding section
bases on at least one unrealistic assumption: the ability of a potential new EU
member to commit himself on all future behaviour as a full member. Given the EU
constitution and the complexity of policies and decision making such a commitment
is hardly possible. No complete agreement can be imagined to fix all necessary
details of new members’ behaviour. The situation of a new member country’s pre-
entry and post-entry is fundamentally different. Pre-entry a candidate has no impact
on the acquis and basically is confronted with one choice: to join the community
with the constitution defined by the old member countries or to stay out. Post-entry
the same country takes part in the decision making process both on day-to-day
policy and the evolution of the constitution with the same rights as the old member
countries.
The post-entry influence can be used for the “national” benefit – i.e. the benefit of
the government, important national interest groups and domestic constituencies. On
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the budgetary field this means to redirect EU spending towards objectives benefiting
the new members. Experiences with former enlargement support the view that this
influence will actually be used: After the accession in 1973 the UK has been
successful in promoting structural spending in order to benefit from Community
spending. The creation of the European Regional Fund can be interpreted in this way
(FOLKERS, 1995). The introduction of the UK rebate soon after the country’s
accession is a further well known example showing how new members successfully
correct distributive effects of EU spending. Also after the Southern enlargement in
the eighties, countries like Portugal and Spain have been successful to redefine
spending priorities of the Common Agricultural Policies to their benefit (BALDWIN
ET AL., 1997).
Looking at this asymmetry between the weak pre-entry and the powerful post-entry
position this turns out to be an important strategic risk factor for the success of
negotiations. Figure 4 describes this problem by depicting the extensive form of the
underlying two period game. The incumbent I has the first move and decides
whether to accept accession of the candidate country C or not. If the incumbent
denies enlargement the game is over with payoffs i3 (n3) for the incumbent (the
candidate countries). If instead he opens the way for enlargement the candidate
country has the next move – as a full member. In this capacity it either respects the
established interests of the old member or not.
The payoffs for the candidate are characterised by the relation c2 > c1 > c3; while
even an enlargement with respect for the incumbent’s interest is preferable to no
enlargement, the highest payoff results from an enlargement without respecting
these interest. For the incumbent obviously the relation i1 > i2 holds. Furthermore it
can be assumed that also i1 > i3 – otherwise the incumbent would never have started
thinking seriously about enlargement. However, it is not clear whether the
incumbent still likes enlargement if the new member country follows the no-respect
path, i.e. whether i2 < or > i3. In the real world this depends for example on the
answer to the following question: Does Spain still like enlargement if this means the
loss of substantial amounts of structural spending to Poland?
If the answer is no, i2 <  i3. In this case the commitment issue becomes crucial for the
success of enlargement. If the candidate could make a credible promise to stick to
the respect path the accession/respect outcome would be the solution. The
distribution of enlargement benefits between both could in this commitment scenario
be decided in the bargaining game as described in the preceding section. Without the
possibility of commitment, however, this outcome is no subgame perfect
equilibrium. The promise of the candidate to respect the incumbent’s interests is not
credible. Therefore the incumbent who rationally realises the candidate’s incentives
as a full member will deny his assent to accession.
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With i2 <  i3, the incumbent still likes to achieve a credible commitment of the
candidate for the respect path, but this issue is no longer crucial for enlargement.
Without the possibility of a credible commitment,  the accession/no respect outcome
will be the resulting equilibrium.
Figure 4: Extensive Form of the Accession Game
        I                             C
In the light of this analysis the strategic function of the enlargement negotiations is
to create commitment devices that guarantee the incumbent countries that
enlargement remains beneficial. In this sense the focus of negotiations should be the
restriction of the post-entry options of candidates. One instrument is the imposition
of transitory periods in which exceptions from the established Community rules are
defined for the disadvantage of new members. An example concern the most
expensive budgetary field, the Common Agricultural Policy, where it is debated
whether farmers in central and eastern Europe should get income support or not. But
also other preparations of incumbent countries outside the accession negotiations
serve the purpose to protect incumbent countries from the actions of future
members. The Agenda 2000 has defined the size and structure of the EU budget
until 2006. Thus there is a binding fiscal framework which would prevent new
countries from changing the budgetary policy for their advantage before the year
2007. “Ring-fencing”, a detail of the Agenda 2000 package illustrates this: For the
financial perspective 2000-2006 budgetary expenditures for EU-15 countries and
new member countries are defined separately. Spending in EU-15 is explicitly
protected from redirecting it to new member countries: “Expenditure earmarked for
headings 1 to 7 [this includes all spending for EU-15 countries, the author] cannot
be used to supplement the cost of new accessions” (INTERINSTITUTIONAL
AGREEMENT, p. C 172/4).
yes to
accession
no to
accession
respect
no
respect
(i1, c1)
(i3, c3)
(i2, c2)
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While one could argue that a protection of incumbents’ interest for few years is not
very much given the long-run influence of new members, the question is which is
the relevant time horizon for the decisive EU actors. For the individuals deciding on
enlargement in the West, it is sufficient if incumbents’ interests are guaranteed for
the individually relevant time horizon. If for example transitionary provisions in
sensitive fields like agriculture and mobility protect present governments and
Members of the European Parliament for two election periods this would in most
cases be sufficient to safeguard personal interests.
4 A Reinterpretation of the Intergovernmental Conference
The preceding analysis leads to a reinterpretation of the IGC. The official rhetoric
motivating the IGC 2000 is characterised by a general interest view: A new Treaty is
said to be necessary in order to keep the EU able to make decisions and to proceed
with integration. Without adequate changes enlargement would paralyse both day to
day work and further developments. Subjects that have been discussed at the
conference since February 2000 are among others: the size and composition of the
Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, the extension of qualified
majority voting in the Council and the allocation of seats in the Parliament given the
700 seats restriction of the Treaty of Amsterdam (see CONFER 2000d for an
overview of reform options and official motivations).
Both the political-economic view and the strategic analysis recommend to take
account of the following driving motive for the Treaty of Nice: Since the IGC 2000
is probably the last opportunity to change the EU constitution without requiring a
consent with the new members, the IGC will also be used to protect the interests of
EU-15 actors during and after enlargement for the disadvantage of new members.
Thus, a success of the IGC is indeed a precondition for enlargement albeit in another
way than motivated officially.
There are two different approaches to protect the interests of present EU actors. The
first approach aims at permanent constitutional changes that work for the advantage
of actors from incumbent member countries. The second approach uses transitory
rules that helps present individuals without giving a permanent protection for people
that in future will replace these individuals. Both approaches are likely to be
implemented in the Treaty of Nice.
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Council
Concerning the reform of the Council, a possible reweighting of votes and/or the
introduction of dual majority are central topics of the IGC 2000. Furthermore, the
possible extension of qualified majority voting instead of the unanimity requirement
is debated. Officially, this debate is driven by the desire to keep this institution able
to take decisions and to limit disproportions between population size and political
influence. A simple extrapolation of the present weighting would after an
enlargement increase these disproportions. Today a qualified majority is possible
with a minimum population share of 58% while this share would drop to 51% in
EU-28 (CONFER, 2000b). Both a reweighting of votes for the benefit of larger
countries and the dual majority would be measures to strengthen democratic
legitimacy of Council decision - if legitimacy is defined to be positively influenced
by a higher degree of population proportionality. Also the extension of qualified
majority would serve this objective since under unanimity disproportions are at a
maximum: The smallest country has equal power to the largest country.
In the logic of the reinterpretation of the IGC 2000 offered here, an additional
motivation might drive these reforms: Reweighting, dual majority and extension of
qualified majority are useful reforms given the strategic objective to limit the power
of new member countries.
In comparison to debated reforms concerning the Parliament (allocation of seats)
and the Commission (number of commissioners), individuals acting in the Council
will not be directly affected in terms of personal career perspectives if the allocation
of votes is changed. These individuals draw their income and privileges from being
members of the national government. The number of votes in a Council decision is
not directly relevant for national re-election chances. However, an indirect link
between Council power and re-election chances exists as described in the above
accession game. Individuals of incumbent governments will be interested to limit the
power of the newcomers. Otherwise they would have to fear to lose control over EU
policies which in the past was helpful to foster re-election chances by favouring
important domestic interest groups.
Under unanimity decision the power of newcomers would be largest: The new
members would command 44,4% of votes necessary for an unanimous decision - 12
out of 27, whereas the population share is 22% (calculated for EU-27, without
Turkey). Therefore, an extension of qualified majority in the Treaty of Nice can also
be interpreted as a measure to defend the interests of the old member countries in the
context of the above described accession game. Thus, decisive actors in EU
institutions might have a double motive to extend majority voting: It reduces the
conflict between deepening and widening and thus guarantees e.g. the Council that
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political cartels can be built; it furthermore reduces the power of the new member
countries.
With majority voting based on the extrapolation of the present weighting scheme the
new members would with 35% of votes have less power than under unanimity but
still have a share far above the population share of 22% (for EU-27 without Turkey,
see table 1). Reweighting could be preferred by EU-15 countries in order to further
reduce this share. The effects of a dual majority where both a certain majority of
votes and population is necessary to reach a qualified majority are more complex.
FELTGEN (1998) analyses this issue with the help of the  Shapley-Shubik power
index for an accession of six countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia,
Estonia, Cyprus). This power index is based on a ‘pivotal’ concept. Each country’s
share out of all possible coalitions is calculated for which this country is crucial to
turn a losing coalition into a winning one (FELSENTHAL AND  MACHOVER, 1998). The
analysis shows (see table 2) that the power of old members in EU-21 is increasing, if
dual majority is introduced compared to the extrapolated present system. The larger
the population share necessary to reach the dual majority the more power the EU-15
countries gain.
In the ongoing debate the weighting of votes is only described as a conflict between
small and large countries in today’s EU. This reinterpretation indicates why small
countries could be willing to accept reweighting for the advantage of large countries:
They might hope that this will benefit old member countries as a whole. This hope is
rational if policy preferences in an enlarged EU will differ much more between old
and new members than between small and large members.
Thus two results emerge: First, it is in the logic of the accession game that
incumbent governments extend majority voting in order to limit the power of
newcomers. Second, in regard to modifications of majority voting, dual majority and
reweighting are substitutive measures to increase the relative power of incumbent
member countries in an enlarged Community.
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Table 2: Distribution of power in the Council - Shapley-Shubik power index (EU-21)
qualified
majority
dual majority
(P60)
dual majority
(P70)
dual majority
(P80)
Germany 9.33 10.26 16.98 20.72
United Kingdom 9.33 9.61 11.43 12.42
France 9.33 9.60 11.38 12.33
Italy 9.33 9.60 11.32 12.12
Spain 7.33 7.56 7.57 8.71
Netherlands 4.44 4.26 3.66 3.54
Greece 4.44 4.24 3.22 2.57
Belgium 4.44 4.24 3.22 2.57
Portugal 4.44 4.24 3.22 2.57
Sweden 3.35 3.21 2.50 2.21
Austria 3.35 3.20 2.43 2.04
Denmark 2.63 2.51 1.82 1.16
Finland 2.63 2.51 1.82 1.16
Ireland 2.63 2.50 1.67 0.86
Luxemburg 1.70 1.60 0.96 0.21
Poland 7.33 7.56 7.37 8.65
Czech Republic 4.44 4.24 3.22 2.57
Hungary 4.44 4.24 3.20 2.56
Slovenia 1.70 1.61 1.04 0.44
Estonia 1.70 1.61 1.02 0.36
Cyprus 1.70 1.60 0.97 0.24
Total 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.00
EU 15/EU 21 78.7 79.14 83.2 85.19
Source: FELTGEN (1998). Qualified majority stands for the extrapolation of the present weighting of votes and
majority requirement. The third to fifth columns calculate power shares for different modifications of dual
majority. P60 indicates: Besides the standard majority of votes (70%) a majority of 60% of the population must
be reached.
Parliament
Regarding the 700 seats restriction of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 190) as given,
enlargement will necessarily reduce the number of EP seats for EU-15 countries. For
today’s individual MP this is a personal disadvantage in terms of re-election
chances. Depending on the country and the scenario (number of new countries,
allocation formula of seats) re-election chances can drop by up to 47% (case of
Ireland under option 1, see table 1). This is, however, only a relevant consideration
if the necessary reduction takes place within the expected active political life of an
individual present MP. A MP who does not intend anyway to serve for another term
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is not personally affected by a reduction of seats for his country. Thus, today’s MP
will tend to favour transitional provisions that delay necessary reductions. The
earliest possible time for the reduction to take effect is after the next European
election in 2004. The latest possible time is probably the legislative period starting
in 2009. Delaying the adjustment until 2009 would protect effectively a majority of
today’s MP as can be seen from the age distribution (table 3). 70% of the Members
of the European Parliament as of July 2000 would be aged 60 or less at the 2004
election so that for them another term would often be interesting. Therefore a large
majority would expect to be personally negatively affected by an early adjustment.
This share will decrease to 46.8% in 2009. This is an indication how transitional
provisions delaying the reduction until 2009 will reduce resistance against
enlargement resulting from the personal interest of today’s MP. Obviously a strategy
to restrict an early enlargement to few and small countries is also capable to protect
these personal interests.
Table 3: Age distribution of present EP members (July 2000) in 2004 and 2009
age class 2004 absolute 2004 cumulative
share
2009 absolute 2009 cumulative
share
<30 5 .80% 1 .16%
31-40 35 6.39% 19 3.19%
41-50 133 27.64% 65 13.58%
51-55 120 46.81% 88 27.64%
56-60 145 69.97% 120 46.81%
61-65 111 87.70% 145 69.97%
66-70 48 95.37% 111 87.70%
>71 29 100.00% 77 100.00%
Own calculations, based on EP membership in July 2000 (website European Parliament).
Further protection would result from adjusting the permanent formula for allocation
of EP seats. The present system is characterised by a strong disproportion in relation
to population benefiting small countries. One option proposed by the EP itself is to
apply a key in direct proportion to the population after granting each country a
minimum of 4 seats (“option 1”). The alternative is a simple extrapolation of the
present formula (“option 2”). As can be seen from table 1, both options have
significant differences for MP of most countries. Option 1 benefits the large four
countries. Since the four largest countries presently have a majority of 360 of a total
626 total and Spain is indifferent between both solutions this could explain why
option 1 is favoured by a majority in the EP (CONFER, 2000c).
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Another advantage of option 1  in terms of this personal interest view is related to
the above described accession game: MPs of EU-15 are likely to fear that
representatives of new member countries will use their power to redirect EU funds
from the West to the East. Therefore, the formula for seat allocation can be seen as
an instrument to limit this risk. Since candidate countries are on average smaller
than incumbent countries option 1 based on population proportionality would reduce
the share of new members’ seats in the parliament. Under option 1 (option 2) EU-15
seats would add up to 465 (452) out of 700 for EU-28. The difference becomes even
more pronounced if the comparison is based on the EU-27 scenario without Turkey.
This characteristic offers therefore another explanation why the EU-15 parliament
favours population proportionality.
Commission
Concerning the Commission the central issue at the IGC 2000 is size and
composition (CONFER, 2000a). More specifically, the question is whether in spite
of enlargement each member state should have a commissioner or not.
Personal interests of present commissioners hoping to be re-appointed in 2005
would best be protected if each country keeps a commissioner. Even then, however,
reappointment chances of 10 present commissioners would be cut by half if the five
large countries lose the second seat in the collegium. Applying an age analysis (see
table 4) similar to the approach for the parliament shows, however, that this is not a
serious problem for the concerned individuals. Commissioners from the five large
countries are relatively old: 8 of a total of 10 will be 60 or above at the time of the
next regular appointment of a new Commission in 2005.  This contrast to the age
structure of commissioners from small countries where 3 of a total of 10 will be 60
or above in 2005. This indicates that resistance against the loss of the second
commissioner for the five larger countries can be expected to be low among the
individuals in today’s Commission. Resistance should be more intense against the
abolition of the principle of national representation since this would hurt a
significant number of present commissioners personally.
Of course, preference of individuals in the Commission will only have a limited
impact on the decisions of the IGC 2000 given the merely consulting role of this
institution in the process. Member countries, Council and Parliament could,
however, design the Commission reform also with regard to limiting the power of
new member countries. Giving each member country only one commissioner would
allocate the new members a weight of 44,4 % in the Commission of EU-27 (without
Turkey) contrasting to a population share of 22% (see table 1). It would obviously
be better for EU-15 to stick to the principle of 2 commissioners for large countries –
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among the new member countries only Poland could claim a second one. This
would, however, be a hardly acceptable strategy since this would further expand the
size of the Commission. An alternative option would be to build groups of small
countries with the right to have one commissioner jointly. This would be able to
increase the share of EU-15 in the Commission.
Table 4: Age of commissioners
Commissioner Country Born Age end of 2005
Franz Fischler Austria 23.09.45 60
Philippe Busquin Belgium 06.01.41 64
Poul Nielson Denmark 1943 62
Erkki Liikanen Finland 19.09.50 55
Pascal Lamy France 1947 58
Michel Barnier France 09.01.51 54
Günter Verheugen Germany 28.04.44 61
Michaele Schreyer Germany 08.08.51 54
Anna Diamantopoulou Greece 1959 46
David Byrne Ireland 26.04.47 58
Romano Prodi Italy 09.08.39 66
Mario Monti Italy 19.03.43 62
Viviane Reding Luxembourg 27.04.51 54
Frits Bolkestein Netherlands 1933 72
Antonio Vitorino Portugal 12.01.57 48
Loyola de Palacio Spain 16.09.50 55
Pedro Solbes Mira Spain 31.08.42 63
Margot Wallström Sweden 28.09.54 51
Neil Kinnock United Kingdom 28.03.42 63
Chris Patten United Kingdom 1944 61
Dates of birth from Commission Website.
Closer cooperation
The European Council of Feira has decided in June 2000 to include provisions on
closer cooperation into the IGC’s work (CONFER, 2000e). The provisions on closer
cooperation (Treaty on European Union, Art. 40, 43-45) have been introduced in
Amsterdam but have so far never been applied. The procedure allows a subgroup of
EU members a closer cooperation and the use of EU institutions for this purpose.
The financial burden of this activity has to be carried by the subgroup itself. The
present provisions include restrictive conditions for starting closer  cooperation: a
majority of countries must take part and this two-speed-approach is subject to a veto
right of all members. Thus, at the IGC it is debated, whether the conditions for using
the closer cooperation should be relaxed.
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Obviously, this initiative is also open for interpreting it in the context of the
accession game. The veto right gives each member country independent from size
equal power to stop any closer cooperation initiative. Thus under the present
provisions each newcomer would have the right to prevent old members from closer
cooperation or at least to sell acceptance in a logrolling process. Abolishing the
veto-right before enlargement takes place could therefore be seen as a further move
to limit the power of newcomers.
5 Political-economic indicators for accession chances
Apart from adjusting the constitution there is a second degree of freedom available
for EU actors to maximise self-interest in the course of enlargement: the choice of
member countries. Inasmuch the Copenhagen criteria and other restrictions still
leave room for interpretation those countries are preferred whose membership would
serve best the interest of individuals in present EU governments, the European
Parliament and the Commission.
The preceding analysis suggests that EU actors face a basic trade-off in choosing
new members. On the one hand they are interested to extend the size of the EU since
this amplifies the political and economic usefulness of European integration
(benefits from trade, power of EU in international negotiations, political cartel,
internalisation of externalities). On the other hand actors from EU-15 face a price for
enlargement in terms of power losses in EU institutions and an increasing fiscal
burden resulting mainly from the Common Agricultural and the Structural Policies
and their application to new member countries. This suggests that the candidate
country is most attractive that for a given size implies the smallest power loss and
the smallest fiscal burden.
Some simple indicators can be constructed that allow to describe the relative
attractiveness of EU candidates in the logic of this approach. Here it is assumed that
GDP (in purchasing power standards) is the variable EU actors are most interested
to maximise. In the political dimension those countries are most attractive that for a
given share of power in EU institutions offer the largest GDP and whose accession
is popular in EU-15. In figure 5 the cost profile of candidate countries in the political
dimension is depicted in terms of the indicators Council votes/GDP and EP
seats/GDP. Option 1 and 2 refer to seat allocations in Parliament based on
population proportionality and the extrapolation of the present scheme, respectively.
Furthermore, public support in EU-15 for the membership of the candidates is
included as an indicator (on the basis of the balance between votes in favour and
against accession of each country). All indicators have been standardised by their
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means and standard deviations. Thus, positive/negative values  indicate a
above/below average position in terms of attractiveness and the unit refer to standard
deviations of the underlying indicator.
Figure 6 depicts the relative attractiveness of candidates in the fiscal dimension. The
following variables serve as indicators since they are crucial for net receipts of a
country in the EU budgetary system: per capita GDP (1999), the share of agriculture
in gross value added (1998), the share of agriculture in employment (1998) and the
unemployment rate (1998). Some of these variables – unemployment rate and GDP
per capita – can also be regarded as indicators of migration pressure since they are
important determinants in any migration decision. Again variables are standardised
and constructed in a way that positive values stand for above average attractiveness.
The following picture emerges: Although countries with large populations tend to be
attractive due to their low political power in EU institutions, some small and
medium countries have an appeal for EU decision makers due to relatively low fiscal
burdens. In contrast countries that like Romania and Bulgaria are large in terms of
population have the handicap of small GDP per Council vote and EP seat and in
addition threat EU-15 actors with high budgetary costs.
Obviously, the construction of any overall indicator of political attractiveness is
necessarily arbitrary and the results must therefore treated with caution.
Nevertheless such an aggregation is helpful to illustrate the reasoning presented.
Table 5 shows results of such an aggregation: It reports the ranks of candidates on
the basis of seven indicators and on the basis of an average of all seven indicators.
This overall indicator puts equal weights to all seven standardised  subindicators.
The order of countries in this table refers thus to their political-economic appeal for
actors in the present member countries. The ordering corresponds to the sequencing
of accession negotiations so far applied: The six countries of the Luxembourg group
(Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia; countries for
which accession negotiations started already in March 1998) are among the top
seven. It also corresponds to the decision of the Helsinki summit in December 1999
to grant Turkey the status of a candidate country: EU membership of Turkey does
not seem to be less popular for decisive actors in EU institutions than a membership
of countries like Romania, Lithuania or Bulgaria.
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Figure 5: Relative attractiveness of candidates: the political price
For the values and sources of underlying indicators see appendix 2. Indicators are standardised
(mean zero and standard deviation one). Positive values indicate above average attractiveness. Malta
not included due to missing values.
Figure 6: Relative attractiveness of candidates: the fiscal price
For the values and sources of underlying indicators see appendix 2. Indicators are standardised
(mean zero and standard deviation one). Positive values indicate above average attractiveness. Malta
not included due to missing values.
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Table 5: Ranks of political-economic appeal for different indicators
mean of
all 7
indicators
GDP/EP
seat
option 1
GDP/
Council
vote
1999 GDP
p.c. in PPS
1998 agric.
share
gross value
added
1998 agric.
share total
employ-
ment
unem-
ployment
net
support
Czech
Republic
1 1 3 3 5 1 4 4
Hungary 2 2 4 4 7 2 5 1
Cyprus 3 10 10 1 4 5 1 2
Poland 4 3 2 6 6 8 8 2
Slovenia 5 6 7 2 1 6 6 10
Slovakia 6 4 6 5 1 3 9 5
Estonia 7 11 12 7 8 4 7 5
Latvia 8 8 9 10 3 7 11 5
Turkey 9 5 1 9 11 12 3 12
Romania 10 7 5 10 10 11 2 11
Lithuania 11 12 11 8 9 9 10 8
Bulgaria 12 9 8 12 12 10 12 8
Source of underlying data see appendix 2. Malta not included due to missing data.
6 Conclusions
The basic insights of the analysis are helpful for three different kinds of conclusions
concerning the enlargement process: for a better understanding of its strategic
difficulties, for cautious forecasts about its likely outcomes and for some normative
considerations.
Strategic difficulties: It would not be a realistic approach to abstract from personal
interests of decisive actors as one (among other) important driving force in accession
negotiations. Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners and politicians
of EU member countries are unlikely to use their influence without taking any
account of personal consequences. Strategically, a compromise between interest of
present and future member countries is complicated by the two-step-nature of the
bargaining . For potential member countries it is not possible to commit pre-entry to
a certain post-entry behaviour. Accession negotiations, the IGC 2000 and the Treaty
of Nice can altogether be interpreted as instruments to overcome this strategic
difficulty and to find a way into enlargement that is credibly beneficial for both
sides.
Cautious forecasts: Fortunately, the forecast resulting from these strategic
difficulties is not a failure of enlargement. A likely outcome is, however, that EU
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actors will use constitutional reforms, the timing and sequencing of enlargement and
transitional provisions as instruments to protect their self-interests.
Since a two class membership is not compatible with the Community’s
constitutional principles, rules are likely to be accepted in the IGC that - as a by-
product – shift relative power in an enlarged Community to EU-15 countries. Due to
the small size of most new member countries, there are thus good chances for larger
population weights in majority voting in the Treaty of Nice. Further constitutional
reforms likely to be implemented in the Treaty of Nice are an extension of majority
voting and a relaxation of flexibility’s preconditions – all these reforms would tend
to increase the power share of EU-15 countries.
It can further be expected that those candidate countries have the best chances for
early accession that combine a relatively low power share in EU institutions with a
relatively modest need for EU transfers. The Luxembourg group plus Slovakia and
Malta therefore seem to have a better prospect for early accession than the other
candidates.
Finally, transitional provisions e.g. in regard to the big spending fields of the EU
budget – agriculture and structural funds – are highly likely because these provisions
would successfully shield incumbent EU governments from deteriorating re-election
chances during their political life-time.
Normative assessment: It is an often experienced fact of political life that welfare
improving projects do not necessarily materialise due to the resistance of vested
interests. This danger is also real in regard to EU enlargement and it is hardly a
promising strategy to simply appeal for more altruism in politics. The economic
profession, however, should work harder to find evidence for the benefits and to
come to a more realistic assessment of existing risks of enlargement. A better public
knowledge about these issues would be likely to make enlargement more popular
among the general public in EU-15. In a democracy, this is the most promising way
to make the success of the project compatible with the self-interest of elected
governments.
This study has largely abstracted from asymmetries of interest within EU-15. This
seems to be a legitimate approach in order to focus the analysis and assuming that
East-West asymmetries are much more pronounced than West-West asymmetries.
Nevertheless the consequences of interest conflicts within EU-15 in regard to
enlargement would seem to be a promising direction for future research.
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Appendix 1
Article 49 Treaty on European Union
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply
to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council,
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the
assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its
component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union
is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement
between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be
submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements.
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Appendix 2
Basis data for indicators on accession chances
1999
popu-
lation
1999
GDP in
bio.
PPS
EP seats
option 1
EP seats
option 2
Council
votes
1999
GDP
p.c. in
PPS,
EU=
100
1998
agric.
share
gross
value
added
1998
agric.
share
total
employ-
ment
1998
unemp-
loyment
1999
net
support
for mem-
bership
EU-15
Turkey 64385 378.3 73 64 10 28 16.9 42.3 6.4 -17
Poland 38667 299.1 46 46 8 37 4.8 19.1 10.6 10
Romania 22489 127.6 28 32 6 27 16.1 40 6.3 -8
Czech
Republic
10290 128.5 15 18 5 59 4.6 5.5 6.5 7
Hungary 10092 107.8 15 18 5 51 5.5 7.5 7.8 16
Bulgaria 8230 39 13 15 4 22 21.1 25.7 16 -3
Slovakia 5393 53 10 12 3 47 4.1 8.2 12.5 -1
Lithuania 3701 14.1 8 11 3 29 10.3 21 13.3 -3
Latvia 2439 22.8 7 7 3 27 4.3 18.8 13.8 -1
Slovenia 1978 29.7 6 7 3 71 4.1 11.5 7.9 -7
Estonia 1446 11.1 6 6 3 36 6.3 9.4 9.9 -1
Cyprus 752 11.4 4 6 2 81 4.4 9.6 3.3 10
Malta 379 n.a. 4 6 2 n.a. 2.7 1.8 5.1 22
Source CONFER
(2000c)
Eurostat
(2000)
CONFER
(2000c)
CONFER
(2000c)
CONFER
(2000b)
Eurostat
(2000)
Eurostat
(2000)
Eurostat
(1999)
Eurostat
(1999)
European
Commis-
sion (2000)
